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Abstract—Internet-of-Vehicles (IoV) is a novel technology to
ensure safe and secure transportation by enabling smart vehicles
to communicate and share sensitive information with each other.
However, the realization of IoV in real-life depends on several
factors, including the assurance of security from attackers
and propagation of authentic, accurate and trusted information
within the network. Further, the dissemination of compromised
information must be detected and vehicle disseminating such
malicious messages must be revoked from the network. To this
end, trust can be integrated within the network to detect the
trustworthiness of the received information. However, most of
the trust models in the literature relies on evaluating node
or data at the application layer. In this study, we propose a
novel hybrid trust management scheme, namely, NOTRINO,
which evaluates trustworthiness on the received information
in two steps. First step evaluates trust on the node itself at
transport layer, while second step computes trustworthiness
of the data at application layer. This mechanism enables the
vehicles to efficiently model and evaluate the trustworthiness
on the received information. The performance and accuracy of
NOTRINO is rigorously evaluated under various realistic trust
evaluation criteria (including precision, recall, F-measure and
trust). Furthermore, the efficiency of NOTRINO is evaluated in
presence of malicious nodes and its performance is benchmarked
against three hybrid trust models. Extensive simulations indicate
that NOTRINO achieve over 75% trust level as compared to
benchmarked trust models where trust level falls below 60% for
a network with 35% malicious nodes. Similarly, 92% precision
and 87% recall are achieved simultaneously with NOTRINO for
the same network, comparing to benchmark trust models where
precision and recall falls below 87% and 85% respectively.
Keywords—Connected Vehicles, Trust Management, Trust
Model, Smart Cities, Internet-of-Vehicles
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, “Internet-of-Vehicles (IoV)” has emerged as a
novel ground-breaking technology to ensure secure, smoother
and safer transportation on the road by enabling the smart ve-
hicles to share sensitive information with each other [1]. This
visionary paradigm of IoV enables smart vehicle equipped
with storage, computational power, communication technolo-
gies and IP-based module to connect to the traditional Internet,
thus comprehending and realizing a significant application of
“Internet-of-Things (IoT)” [2]. In IoV, the integrated multi-
communication modules enable the vehicles to interact with
each other, adjacent roadside units (RSUs) and neighbouring
pedestrians via various distinct modes of communication, i.e.,
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) and
vehicle-to-pedestrian (V2P) communications, to offer a wide
range of applications which can be categorized into safety
(e.g., steep-curve or accident warnings) and non-safety (e.g.,
weather updates) applications. Security applications impose
strict requirements on the network in terms of delay, safety,
privacy and trust, while these requirements are bit relaxed in
non-safety applications [3]. Fig. 1 illustrates the integration
and realization of IoV within smart city environment, which
shows that messages are transmitted and exchanged among
































Fig. 1: Realization of IoV in Smart City
Same as all open medium-based networks, IoV is prone to
several security issues [4]. Hence, securing IoV has attracted
the attention of both academic and industrial researchers.
Overall, existing solutions are classified into cryptography-
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based solutions [5] and trust-based solutions [6]. While the
first category is known to ensure most of the desired security
services, it suffers from the high computational and time
overhead which can lead to unwanted situations, especially
for IoV safety applications. On the other hand, trust can
be seen as an alternative solution that can ensure the same
security services without exhausting the network’s resources
which makes of it more suitable to delay-sensitive and highly
dynamic environment like IoV [7]. In the context of IoV,
trust is defined as the faith which one vehicle places in other
vehicle(s) for sharing reliable, trusted, accurate, and authentic
messages [7], [8].
Trust models are generally classified into node-centric, data-
centric, and combined models depending on the revocations
target. To achieve this purpose various metrics are used such
as interactions evaluation, exchange of recommendation, and
messages analysis, to name a few. However, existing solutions
are either application-specific (safety or infotainment) or in-
volving various similarity measurements to compare the gen-
erated messages, and these measurements add a considerable
undesired overhead. In addition, most of the solutions focus
on eliminating dishonest vehicles or filtering out malicious
messages based on identity related metrics or messages anal-
ysis metrics. Even combined trust models consider only one
category of metrics. Whereas, a legitimate node can generate
fake message due to a sensor problem, and a dishonest node
can generate true messages about an occurring event. Thus,
considering both nodes honesty and messages quality analysis
is a must for an efficient trust establishment solution.
To overcome above issues, we propose ‘NOTRINO’, a novel
hybrid trust management scheme for IoVs which enables the
vehicles to efficiently evaluate the information authenticity
by evaluating trust in two steps, i.e., first step classifies the
message sender as trustworthy or malicious at the transport
layer of IoV, and second step evaluates the authenticity of the
received messages at the application layer. Data trustworthi-
ness is performed only, if a node is classified as trustworthy
at transport layer, thus enabling the vehicles to efficiently rely
on the received message or not.
In summary, the significant contributions of this study are
as follows:
• A novel hybrid trust model (‘NOTRINO’) based on the
protocol stack of IoV is proposed.
• An efficient and light-weight trust model which can
not only evaluate node trustworthiness, but also data
trustworthiness is proposed.
• A fully distributed trust model to match the disperse and
distributed nature of IoV environment is introduced.
• An attack-resistant trust model is proposed, as it has the
ability to efficiently detect the attackers
• Extensive simulations are performed to validate our pro-
posal, and evaluated the efficiency of NOTRINO from
accuracy and trust aspects.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
Section II, we present related work on trust management
in IoV. Next, Section III introduces the system model of
NOTRINO, while Section IV provides details on the design of
our proposed NOTRINO scheme. Afterwards, the simulation
environment is explained in Section V, while Section VI is
dedicated to different simulation results of NOTRINO. Finally,
conclusions based on NOTRINO are drawn in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
In IoV, the main objective of the trust models is to pro-
vide an environment, where information can be propagated
among network entities in a secure and trusted environment.
Further, the trust model ensures that every participating node
gets trusted information. However, due to the volatile, highly
mobile nature of vehicles in IoV, evaluating trust in a short
period of time is extremely challenging [9], [10].
IoV involves two significant revocation targets, i.e., (1)
participating nodes, and (2) information shared between these
nodes [6], [11]. Based on these targets, trust in IoV can be
broadly classified into three distinct categories, i.e., (1) node-
centric trust models, (2) data-centric trust models, and (3)
combined trust models [12]–[14] as shown in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2: Classification of Trust Models in IoV
A. Node-centric Trust Models (NCT)
These trust models aim at eliminating dishonest nodes from
the network by evaluating trustworthiness of the message
transmitting vehicles. These trust models highly rely on its
neighbours, whose main responsibility is to provide opinions
to message evaluator node (MEval) by endorsing the rep-
utation of the message sender. Currently, various NCT are
proposed in literature recently. For instance, Yang presented
a novel NCT, namely ‘Trust and Reputation Management
Framework’ where a similarity mining approach is utilized
to evaluate the trustworthiness of the message transmitter
[15]. When messages are disseminated within the network,
MEval identifies the similarity among messages based on
the Euclidean distances and the reputation weights of the
participating nodes. The scope of this approach is limited as
trust is computed locally at the MEval. Further, the details on
recommendation reliability is missing from this study.
A centralized node-centric trust model was proposed by
Marmol et al., where MEval relies on the adjacent infras-
tructure to evaluate neighbour’s reputation [16]. MEval upon
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reception of the messages generate a fuzzy-based trust score
to classify the message sender as legitimate or dishonest. First,
the MEval calculates trust score by aggregating information
via three distinct sources, i.e., (a) recommendation provided by
infrastructure, (b) recommendation from neighbouring nodes,
and (c) previous reputation of the message transmitter. Second,
MEval takes one of the following decisions based on the com-
puted trust. (1) Drop the message if not trustworthy, (2) Accept
the information but do not forward message, and (3) Accept
the information and forward it. The main shortcoming of this
trust model is its nature of evaluating trust via infrastructure,
which cannot be guaranteed in rural areas.
Haddadou et al., on the other hand, adapted an economic
incentive model to exclude dishonest nodes from the network
[17]. In this model, every node within the network is assigned
with a specific credit value. The increments and decrements of
the credit depends solely on the behaviour of the node within
the network, i.e., credits increment for good behaviour of the
node. In case of an attack, credit of the participating node
is decremented. MEval categorizes the node as malicious if
the credit is 0 and, therefore, it excludes the node from the
network. The major constraint of this trust model is its inability
to differentiate between direct or indirect trust.
Another NCT was introduced by Khan et al., where a
cluster-based approach is utilized to evaluate trust on the nodes
[18]. In this method, cluster head (CH) is elected first in
the network, which employs a watchdog mechanism within
its vicinity, thus, providing an opportunity to honest nodes
to submit their recommendation to CH about the presence of
misbehaving entity in the network. Upon the detection of such
misbehaving and dishonest nodes, CH informs the trusted
authority (TA) which eliminates such nodes from the pool
of trusted nodes. The major drawback of this approach is the
generation of high amount of overheads which is caused to the
continuous exchange of reports between nodes, thus reducing
the overall efficiency of the network.
A similar cluster-oriented trust model was proposed by
Jesudoss et al., where CH is responsible to eliminate dishonest
nodes from the network [19]. In order to gain the reputation
within the network, every node follows a truth-telling approach
to share true information with the CH . Further, these nodes
must participate in the election of CH in the network. Based
on the participation of the nodes, CH provides incentives
in the form of weights to these nodes. CH only trusts the
information, if the participating node gains higher weights in
CH election. This solution fails in a highly mobile and rural
scenario due to limited number of neighbouring vehicles. As
a result, the presence of dishonest nodes in such location may
result in the biased selection of CH .
Recently, Alnasser et al. [20] proposed a recommendation-
based trust model to deal with internal attackers of the
network. In this proposed trust model, trust is computed
based on the weighted-sum method in a fully decentralized
manner. Further, this trust model provides the evaluator node
to compute trust via both direct and indirect trust methods.
However, the main drawback of this trust model is its nature
of trust computation via weighted sum which can result in a
biased trust computation if the evaluator node is surrounded
by majority of the malicious nodes, thus compromising the
network security.
B. Data-centric Trust Models (DCT)
Works falling under this category have the common aim
of filtering out malicious messages rather than blacklisting
vehicles (IDs), as the later action can lead to the undesired
situation of network fragmentation. This task can be achieved
either by eliminating messages coming from dishonest IDs
or by verifying the exchanged messages themselves if not
encrypted.
The data-centric trust model proposed by Gurung et al.
[21] involves the message content similarity, message content
conflict, and message routing path to decide whether the
message is malicious or legal. The main problem with this
solution is that it runs all the three-time consuming procedures
for every single message. In addition, it does not consider the
extreme cases of mobility (very dense and very sparse cases).
Authors of [22] proposed a data-centric trust model for
anonymous VANET. Based on four parameters namely loca-
tion closeness, time closeness, location verification, and time
stamp verification they compute a confidence value regarding
every message describing an event. While preserving vehicles’
IDs, this scheme suffers from various environment-related
problems including the huge number of messages describing
the same event. In addition, safety messages are known to
be very sensitive to the delay, waiting for the confidence
processing time can lead to unwanted situations like late
accident notification.
Unlike [22], Rawat et al. [23] introduced combined op-
portunistic/deterministic approaches. In the first one, they
compute the similarity between messages describing a same
event. Hence, with the assumption that legitimate messages are
in majority, they filter out the different minority of messages.
On the other hand, the deterministic approach is based on
coordinates of vehicles position and received signal strength
estimation. By comparing the two values malicious vehicles
can be detected and hence also their messages. Same as [22],
[23] is also time consuming and cannot perform as expected
in critical cases. In addition, this solution also requires a large
number of communicating vehicles to perform.
Kerrache et al. [24] proposed a safety-related data-centric
trust model where the main purpose is how to disseminate
only trustworthy messages while avoiding the known broad-
cast storm problem. Taking advantage of the standardized
messaging services of ETSI [25], they piggybacked a belief
degree about the occurring event and an ID of the selected
next broadcaster of the message. Even though this solution
has the advantage of respecting the ETSI ITS standard, only
selected nodes will broadcast the events’ messages. Hence,
vehicles outside the communication range of the selected next
broadcaster will not be informed about occurring events.
Finally, based on the evaluation of direct interactions among
vehicles and without any exchanged recommendations, Gazdar
et al. proposed a data-centric trust model called Enhanced
Distributed Trust Computing Protocol (EDCTP) [26]. In this
solution, every vehicle verifies the reliability of the event
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triggered messages sent by its neighbors. In addition, the
verification in this proposal is assumed to be made only by
nodes within the same event zone, then a trust value will be
given to the message source based on its credibility. Authors of
this work also proposed a tier-based messages dissemination
technique in order to detect altered messages and fake events.
However, this work requires the existence of many vehicles
within the event zone to perform.
C. Combined Trust Models (CT)
In this specific category of the trust models, both ‘entity’
and ‘data’ are taken into account in order to evaluate trust-
worthiness on the node and its shared data. Therefore, CT
integrates both merits and demerits of NCT and DCT.
Recently, various studies are proposed in literature which
evaluate trustworthiness on both data and node. For instance,
Dhurandher et al. proposed an event-oriented trust model to
distribute trusted content among the nodes by employing a
wide range of reputation and plausibility checks throughout the
network [27]. This trust model operates in following four steps
to identify and revoke dishonest vehicles from the network: (1)
discovering neighbour to the MEval, (2) dispatching data to
the identified neighbours, (3) deciding trust on the received
message based by defining detection and threshold ranges,
and (4) continuously monitoring neighbourhood for possible
neighbours around MEval. Though this technique can identify
dishonest nodes in the network, however, there are some
limitations in the proposed study: First, the study limits the
detection range of MEval to 50 m, which is very short.
Second, the detection solely depends on the vehicle’s sensors.
In case of sensor malfunction, the overall network will be
polluted with compromised information as the MEval may
classify legitimate messages as malicious.
In order to identify nodes transmitting compromised infor-
mation within the network, Ahmed et al. proposed a logistic
based trust computation technique, where MEval directly
observes the events occurring within the network [28]. The
neighbouring vehicles share the information about the event
with MEval. Based on this provided information, MEval
classifies the behaviour of the sender node as legitimate or
malicious via weighted voting and logistic trust function.
Though this technique can efficiently identify dishonest ve-
hicles, it can propagate malicious content in the network. Due
to its nature of evaluating trust based on weighted voting, the
trust computation can be biased if MEval is surrounded by
dishonest nodes.
Similarly, Li et al. introduced an efficient attack-resistant
combined trust model, where MEval estimates trust on the
received information, by evaluating both node and data-centric
trust [29]. The data trustworthiness is calculated based on
Bayesian Inference (BI), where MEval relies on the informa-
tion received from multiple neighbours. On the other hand,
MEval integrates functional trust (FT) and recommendation
trust (RT) to evaluate node-centric trustworthiness. FT ensures
that the participating node behaves properly while communi-
cating with MEval, while, RT maintains that a certain level of
trust is maintained before the node can be trusted. This scheme
does not take data sparsity into account, which is pervasive in
IoV.
Shrestha et al., proposed a combined trust model, where
MEval calculates trust in two steps: (1) First it evaluates
trust on the node, where a clustering algorithm distinguishes
the honest and dishonest nodes, and categorized them into
two separate groups [30]. Second, it calculates trust on the
received messages based on the modified threshold random
walk algorithm. The main drawback of this scheme is its
assumption of uniform distribution of dishonest nodes in the
network [34], which is invalid in IoV as the vehicles are placed
randomly throughout the network.
Mahmood et al. presented a novel combined trust model
which relies on traditional clustering mechanism to evaluate
trust on the network nodes [31]. In this trust model, CH is
elected in the network based on the trust of the participating
nodes and their available resources. CH is responsible for
transmitting trusted messages within the network. However,
the main drawback of this approach is the biased election of
CH , if majority of the nodes are dishonest in the network.
To share resources in a secure way among different network
entities, Hatzivasilis et al. proposed a new combined trust
model, namely, MobileTrust [32]. This proposal takes into
account the advantages of the back-end centralised cloud and
5G technologies to provide an environment where trusted
information can be disseminated in VANET. Further, Mo-
bileTrust encourages cryptographic communication between
network entities, thus providing partially privacy in the net-
work. However, the main drawback of this approach is its
reliance on the centralized cloud for trust computation. In case
the access to the cloud is denied by intruders, MobileTrust fails
to compute trust of the participating vehicles, which ultimately
compromise the overall network security.
Further Khan et al. recently proposed a combined trust
model where blockchain is utilized to prevent attacks within
VANET [33]. In this proposal, the node trustworthiness is
evaluated based on the data added within the public blockchain
in the infrastructure domain. Though this solution provides
immutability and data integrity to some extent, this solution
results in high delay due to the fact that all the trustworthiness
is calculated at the back-end infrastructure. Further, the authors
didn’t provide any details about scalability of their solution,
which is a standard issue in the blockchain systems.
In a nutshell, various trust models have been proposed in
IoV, which ensures the propagation of trusted content in the
network. According to our literature review, most of these
trust models operate only at the application layer, which
arises technical challenges including higher network delays.
Table I summarizes the main exiting trust models for IoV. In
this paper, we propose a novel combined trust model which
operates at the two layers, i.e., network and application layer.
Trustworthiness of the node is computed at the transport layer,
while, data trustworthiness is evaluated only at the application
layer, if a node is classified as trustworthy at the lower layer.
This makes our proposed method very efficient to evaluate the
overall trust in IoV environments.
In the next section, we provide explanations of our proposed
trust model.
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TABLE I: Main Trust Models for IoV.
Trust class Type of applications Trust metrics
Node-centric Data-centric Combined Safety Infotainment Messages Interactions’ Exchanged Role of RSUs and TA




















A. Preliminaries and Assumptions
To design a hybrid trust management scheme, it is assumed
that every vehicle in the network is equipped with NOTRINO,
which can evaluate both node-centric and data-centric trust-
worthiness. Further, every vehicle maintains two databases. (1)
First database to keep track of all the encountered vehicles,
and (2) Second database to maintain respective trust ratings.
Moreover, it is also assumed that RSUs are only used to
disseminate messages over a greater geographical location.
Furthermore, all the vehicles are equipped with GPS modules
which provide the exact location of the participating nodes.
Last, all the nodes are equipped with IEEE 802.11p module
to interact with other nodes via V2V communication.
B. Network Model
IoV refers to a network where vehicles rely on each other
and trusted sources to share trusted, accurate and authentic
information in order to increase traffic efficiency. Therefore, a
network model is designed to test the proposed trust model in
presence of dishonest nodes, whose solely aim is to distribute
malicious content to network nodes. At any given time, a
safety event (an accident) is generated within the network
where this information is propagated among network nodes
via V2V communication. As majority of the nodes are stranger
to each other, all the nodes evaluate the authenticity of the
received information in two dimensions, i.e., (1) trust against
sending node, and (2) trust against received information. These
legitimate nodes broadcast and share only that information
which is classified as authentic and trustworthy. Messages,
which fail to satisfy trust criteria, are dropped in order to re-
duce the probability of propagating compromised information
within network nodes.
C. Adversary Model
An adversary represents such class of nodes which can gain
unauthorized access with the intention to perform different
attacks within IoV [35]. The decentralized, large-scale and
open nature of IoV can provide opportunity to adversary to
be part of the network. In IoV, the main motivation of the
adversary can be to detect legitimate communication between
legitimate vehicles and tamper, forge, jam or delay the safety
messages within the network. Moreover, attackers can also
pollute the network with bogus information and recommen-
dations [36], [37]. In this paper, we considered two different
attacker models, which not only tamper the safety messages,
but also, dodge the legitimate nodes to trust the compromised
messages by sharing bogus trust ratings.
1) Man-in-the-Middle (MiTM) Attacks: These attacks are
considered as one of the significant attacks in IoV, as the nodes
can modify, tamper, forge, delay or drop the messages which
may contain sensitive information [4], [38]. In this paper, we
considered the MiTM attackers with modification capability.
Upon receiving the safety messages, MiTM attacker will mod-
ify the content before sharing it with neighbouring vehicles.
Further, the attackers will share compromised trust ratings with
their neighbours. Moreover, MiTM attacker remains active
throughout the network at all the time.
2) Zig-Zag Attacks: These attacks are also known as “On-
and-Off” attacks, where the malicious nodes adapt a random
pattern for their attacks in the network. First, these nodes
behaves normally in order to get trust within the network.
Once, these nodes become part of the network, these attacks
behave maliciously and launch attacks within the network.
These attacks are hard to be detected by the trust management
schemes as they use both legitimate and malicious behaviours
within the network. In this paper, these attackers share legit-
imate messages for some time. Once, they gain trust within
the network, the attackers launch an attack, where they impose
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false trust ratings with the neighbouring nodes.
IV. NOTRINO: A NOVEL TRUST MODEL
In this section, we provide details of our novel trust model,
i.e., NOTRINO. Further, Table II lists important abbreviations
used in this manuscript.




TMENTITY Trust model at the transport layer
MTR Message threshold range
ht Antenna height of message sender
hr Antenna height of message evaluator
TV alue Trust Value
TVmin Minimum trust value
TThreshold Minimum trust threshold
αPartial Represents partial reward
TLevel Trust level at transport layer
V ehDatabase Vehicular Database
Application
Layer
TMDATA Trust model at the application layer
RoT Role-oriented trust
InfoQ Quality of the received information
δ Effective distance
η Tier-boundary
TrustLevel Trust level at application layer
α Overall reward for honesty
β Punishment factor for dishonesty
A. Overview of the Proposed Trust Model
In this work, a novel combined trust model is designed,
where a layered approach is taken to evaluate trust on both
entity and received data. Entity verification is performed at
the transport layer, while, Data verification is operated at
the application layer of IoV. MEval accepts information only
if both node and data are verified. Otherwise it rejects the
received messages and classify the transmitter as dishonest.
The protocol stack of IoV according to OSI reference model
is depicted in Fig. 3. For the sake of simplicity, we presented a
generalized protocol stack for IoV. In addition to the presented
layers, a vertical layer of security and management can also be
considered [39]. Further, it also depicts that our trust model is
composed of two parts which are distributed over two layers,
i.e., TMENTITY lies at the transport layer, while TMDATA is







































Fig. 3: Integration of Proposed Trust Model in IoV
in conjunction together for the calculation of overall trust. The
high-level working mechanism of the proposed trust model is
highlighted in Fig. 4, depicting, it involves two major steps.
Step 1: MEval upon receiving the packet from a message
transmitter forwards it to the transport layer, where trustworthi-
ness against the node is performed. If the entity is not reliable,
then the distrust for the sender node is computed and message
is discarded.
Step 2: If the node is reliable, message is passed to the
application layer to verify the received data. If data is not
verified, then the message is discarded, and the distrust is
computed for the sender node. However, in case of successful
verification of the data, MEval accepts the message and reward
the sender node with maximum trust value.






















Step 1: Evaluating Node-Centric 
Trustworthiness
Step 2: Evaluating Data-Centric 
Trustworthiness
No
Fig. 4: Flow Chart of Proposed Trust Model
B. Operation of Proposed Trust Model
As depicted in Fig. 4, our trust model operates in two steps,
i.e., TMENTITY , and TMDATA.
1) TMENTITY : First stage of the trust model is ded-
icated to evaluate the entity trustworthiness at the MEval.
Every MEval in the network has a specific range, i.e., MTR.
According to [40], MTR depends directly upon (1) the dis-
tance (DistMSenderMEval ) between MEval and message sender
(MSender), (2) antenna height (ht) of MSender, and (3)
antenna height (hr) of MEval. In a delay-sensitive network
like VANET, a slight change in the antenna position and height
can distort the signal strength, which ultimately results in a
signal loss [41], [42]. This directly impacts the MTR and the
neighbouring vehicles may be unable to receive the transmitted






+ (ht + hr)2 (1)
Next, MEval performs an initial check on the received
message based on this MTR. If received message is from
outside of the MTR, the message is dropped and classified
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as malicious. However, for every message received within the
MTR, MEval will check the presence of the (MSender) within
its database, i.e., V ehDB , across its ID, i.e., IDNode. For
every past encounter with vehicles, MEval keeps record of
the behaviour based on the trustworthiness of the transmitted
message. For every previous good behaviour and message
transmission, MEval always provides a positive rating and for
malicious transmission a negative rating is assigned. If the
vehicle resides in the V ehDB , then MEval checks its trust
value (TV alue). If the TV alue surpasses the minimum trust
threshold (TThreshold) level, then MEval forwards the data
towards the application layer, where, the trust is evaluated
against the received data, i.e., TMDATA. Further, MEval
increments the TV alue of the message transmitter by a value
of αPartial. If the TV alue of the received message is below
TThreshold, then the MEval directly classify the message as
malicious, and provides a minimum trust value (TVmin) to the
message sender, in order to discourage the sender to transmit
compromised and malicious messages in future.
However, for vehicles encountering with the MEval for the
first time, an entry (IDNode) is created within V ehDB for
the new vehicle. Further, MEval assigns an initial trust value
(TrustInitial) to new vehicles, and forwards the message
towards TMDATA for data verification.
It is worth mentioning here that message transmitter receives
full reward only, if it satisfies trust conditions in both step 1
(TMENTITY ) and step 2 (TMDATA). Algorithm 1 shows the
algorithm for trust calculation at stage 1, i.e., TMENTITY .
Algorithm 1: Trust Calculation at TMENTITY
Result: Trust Calculation at TMENTITY
Required: Message = M ; Node ID = IDNode; Database
= V ehDatabase; Trust Value = TV alue; Minimum Trust
Value = TVmin; Initial Trust Value = TrustInitial;
Trust Threshold = TThreshold; Message Threshold
Range = MTR; Partial Reward = αPartial
if (M ∈ MTR) then
Check Node ID (IDNode);
if (IDNode ∈ V ehDatabase) then
Check TV alue;
if (TV alue ≥ TThreshold) then
Forward M to TMDATA;
TLevel = TLevel + αPartial;
else




Insert IDNode to V ehDatabase;





Insert IDNode to V ehDatabase;
Assign TV alue = TMin;
end
2) TMDATA: Once, the entity is evaluated at the lower
layers, the next step involves the evaluation of data at the
application layer, i.e., TMDATA. We define trust at this level
as follows:
Trust = f(RoT, InfoQ, δ) (2)
Equation 2 depicts that Trust is a function of three pa-
rameters, i.e., role-oriented trust (“RoT”), information quality
(“InfoQ”) and effective distance (“δ”). As the data is being
evaluated at this layer, therefore, the trust function must take
into account the information quality and the geographical in-
formation provided by the vehicles. Further, RoT is integrated
within the network to maintain minimum trust level. Based on








Role-oriented Trust (RoT): RoT corresponds to such
vehicles, whose information is regarded as highly trusted.
Every vehicular network incorporates such vehicles within
its network at most of the times. These include police, taxis
and ambulances, to name a few. In order to incorporate
the information from such vehicles, our trust management
scheme integrates RoT in order to provide higher weight to
the information disseminated by such vehicles. Therefore,
the presence of following four classes of vehicles (V eh)
are considered in the network. (1) High Authority Vehicles
(V ehHA): This class includes police vehicles and ambulances.
Since, these vehicles are authorized from the central authority,
therefore, the information generated by these vehicles is
highly trusted. (2) Public Transport Vehicles (V ehPT ):
includes public buses and local council supported taxis.
The information is considered as highly authentic as these
are authorized by a specific governmental department such
as department of transportation. (3) Professional Vehicles
V ehPro: represents private car-hire vehicles and drivers
having high experience of travel within the network. (4)
Traditional Vehicles V ehTrad: are vehicles with minimum
or no travel history. For first three classes, higher RoT trust
values are assigned, while for the last class, we assign low
weights. These vehicles have to gain trust of the participating
vehicles in order to be able to have impact within the network.
We calculate RoT using equation 4:
RoT = η × Trust(t− 1) (4)
where η is the weight assigned to the information generated
by the vehicles. For the first three classes of the vehicles
(V ehHA, V ehPT , V ehPro), higher weights are assigned, and




0.8 ≤ η ≤ 1.0 if veh = V ehHA, V ehPT , V ehPro
0.5 ≤ η < 0.8 if veh = V ehTrad
(5)
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Once, η is calculated using equation 5, the overall RoT
is calculated via equation 4. We summarize the process of
assigning weight to RoT-factor in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Weight Calculation for RoT
Result: Weight Calculation for RoT
Required: Message = M ; vehicle type = veh; High
Authority vehicles (vehHA); Public transport vehicles
vehPT ; Professional vehicles vehPro; Traditional
vehicles vehTrad; weight η;
Get vehicle type (veh);
if ((veh) = vehHA or vehPT or vehPro ) then
0.8 ≤ η ≤ 1.0;
else
0.5 ≤ η < 0.8;
end
Effective Distance: Once, the message (M) is received at
the application layer, MEval calculates the effective distance
(δ) based on the tier-based approach. Specifically, three
distant levels (i.e., tier-1, tier-2, and tier-3) are identified
between MEval and MSender to incorporate geographical
parameters. In order to calculate δ, MEval first calculates




(MEvalx −MSenderx)2 + (MEvaly −MSendery )2
(6)
In above equation, MEvalx and MEvaly represents the x
and y coordinates of MEval, while MSenderx and MSendery
corresponds to resulting x and y coordinates of event
generator, i.e., MSender.
Further, we define a parameter ‘ξ’ as tier-boundary. As
depicted in Fig. 5, we defined three tiers between MEval and
event generator, thus resulting in three tier-boundaries between
MEval and the event generator, namely, ξ1, ξ2 and ξ3. Further,
ξ1 =
MTR
3 , ξ2 = (ξ1+
MTR
3 ) and ξ3 = (ξ2+
MTR
3 ). Based on




1 if 0 < Dist ≤ ξ1
δ
2 if ξ1 < Dist ≤ ξ2
0 if ξ2 < Dist ≤ ξ3
(7)
Information Quality (InfoQ): InfoQ corresponds to the
quality of the information generated by the event generator as
proposed by ETSI [25]. InfoQ directly relies on the distance
of the MEval and event generator. Greater the distance
between MEval and event generator, low value of the InfoQ
is assigned by the MEval. This value increases as the distance
between the MEval and event generator decreases. As our
model has three tiers (depicted in Fig. 5), we can co-relate
and translate InfoQ according to the distance parameter δ.
i.e., if the event generator lies within first tier, high weights








Fig. 5: Tier-based Threshold Approach
tier-3 event generators as the distance between them and the
MEval increases. For every message arriving from outside of
the MTR, ‘0’ is assigned as the MEval is unknown about the
event generator. We assign following values to InfoQ based
on our tier-based topology according to eq. 8.
InfoQ =

1 if 0 < d ≤ ξ1/2
0.833 if ξ1/2 < d ≤ ξ1
0.666 if ξ1 < d ≤ ξ2/2
0.500 if ξ2/2 < d ≤ ξ2
0.333 if ξ2 < d ≤ ξ3/2
0.167 if ξ3/2 < d ≤ ξ3
0 if d ≥ ξ3
(8)
C. Trust Decision
Once, the desired parameters (RoT, δ, InfoQ) are calcu-
lated using equations 4, 7 and 8, the MEval calculates trust
using equation 3. In case, the MEval accepts the data of the
sender, MEval increments the trust level of the sender with
a factor of α, and decrements it in the same fashion with a
factor of β for distrust, i.e.,
TrustLevel =
{
TV alue + α if TLevel ≥ TThreshold
TV alue − β if TLevel < TThreshold
(9)
In above equation, α is the full reward given by MEval to
MSender for his honesty and providing true content. Similarly,
β is the punishment provided by MEval for malicious content.
α and β have relative values and their values can be dependent
on the considered application. In our case, we design trust
model to ensure propagating trusted messages, therefore, we
assign higher weights to α than β to encourage legitimate
nodes to keep providing true content and discouraging dis-
honest nodes to share malicious content in future. Further, we
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adapted a phenomenon that trust is very hard to gain, therefore,




The selection of α and β are user-defined and it depends
on the user requirement within the network [43]. Strictness of
this criterion will result in the propagation of higher number
of trusted messages in the network. However, relaxing this
criterion will enable the vehicles to receive messages, which
may be generated from dishonest vehicles.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Simulation Scenario
We evaluated the performance of our proposed trust model
using VEINS, a popular open-source simulator to model
different components of vehicular networks [44], [45]. We
validated our proposal on a real map from the city of Derby,
United Kingdom, which we extracted from OpenStreetMap
[46], [47] as shown in Fig. 6. We placed five RSUs at fixed
locations in the network, which only disseminate the messages
over large distances. Further, we generated the mobility of 100
vehicles in this network via SUMO, which is enough for many
urban scenarios [48].
Fig. 6: Simulated Map of Derby, United Kingdom
In order to evaluate the efficiency of our trust model,
a safety-related event (accident) is generated at a random
location within the network. Every node is able to receive
this information which is generated by the first available node
in the network. Next, we introduced malicious nodes in the
network to evaluate the efficiency of the trust model to tackle
the attacker behaviour. Initially, we considered 5% malicious
nodes in the network which are sharing compromised mes-
sages with its neighbours. We then increased the proportion
of malicious nodes step-wise to 40% to study the efficiency
of trust model in detecting true content in the network.
In our simulations, legitimate vehicles are equipped with our
proposed trust model, thus enabling them to validate the au-
thenticity and trustworthiness of the generated event. Further,
the antenna height (ht and hr) of the message transmitting
and message receiving vehicles is kept constant, i.e., 1.895 m.
In our model, this information regarding ht and hr is always
piggybacked along with the message, so that the receiver can
detect the messages transmitted by the vehicle. Moreover, a
Two-Ray Interference radio propagation model is used in our
simulations [40].
Every simulation scenario has twenty-five runs with random
seed value to ensure unique initial vehicle assignment in
the network. Furthermore, the experimental results for every
scenario is also generated by averaging over twenty-five runs.
The details of simulation are listed in Table III.
TABLE III: Simulation Details
Parameters Details
Simulation Time (secs) 600 secs
Simulation Area (km × km) 4km × 2.5km
Vehicles Distribution Random
Total Vehicles 100
RoT Vehicles (%) 5
Total RSUs 5
Total Dishonest Vehicles (%) 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40
MAC Protocol IEEE 802.11p
Network Protocol WAVE
Radio Propagation Model Two-Ray Interference
ht (m) 1.895
hr (m) 1.895
Packet Size (Data + Header) 1280 (1024 + 256) bits
TrustInitial 0.5




We chose following three significant trust evaluation criteria
to evaluate the efficiency of our proposed trust model, i.e., (1)
How accurate is the trust model, (2) How many true events
the trust model can detect? and (3) How trusted information
is disseminated in the network [49]. To satisfy these trust
evaluation criteria, we use following metrics:
• Precision – when trustworthy event is predicted, how
often it is predicted correctly. Let PA|H illustrates the
probability of the node to detect as an attacker, given
the legitimate node and PA|A represents the probability
to detect node as an attacker, given an attacker, then





• Recall – when the event is actually trustworthy, how often
trust model predicts it. Let PA|A presents the probability
of trust model to detect node as an attacker, given node
is an attacker and PH|A resents probability of detecting
malicious node as legitimate node, given the node is an

















































































Fig. 7: Accuracy of Proposed Trust Model under MiTM attacks (a) Precision (b) Recall (c) F-Measure
• F-Measure – overall, how often event (i.e., accident)
classification is correct. F-Measure is given as:






• Trust Metric – A significant metric elaborating the ability
of trust model to classify received messages as trust-
worthy or malicious. Let ‘α’ is the reward assigned to
the legitimate sender for their honesty, and ‘β’ is the
corresponding punishment factor awarded to the attacker,
then trust factor (T ) can be given as:
T =
{
T + α if T ≥ TrustThreshold
T − β if T < TrustThreshold
(14)
• Variation of Trust in Legitimate Nodes – Depicts, how
trust changes for legitimate nodes, in presence of dishon-
est nodes disseminating malicious data, and
• Variation of Trust in Dishonest Nodes – how strictly trust
model ensures minimum trust level of dishonest nodes.
• End-to-End (E2E) Delay – The Quality-of-Service (QoS)
related metric indicating the time taken by the packets
to reach the destination. Since, very sensitive data is
present in VANET, therefore packets should be shared
with legitimate nodes with minimum possible E2E delays.
Let TGenerated is the packet generated time and TArrival
depicts the time of packet arrival at the destination, then
E2E delay can be given as:
E2E Delay = TArrival − TGenerated (15)
• Packet Detection Rate vs Trust Threshold – ability of trust
model to detect true packets against different threshold
levels of trust.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
We compared the efficiency of our trust model with three
baseline trust management schemes, i.e., ART [29], Chen [50]
and TMEC [51]. We chose these trust models as they are
hybrid in nature, i.e., they not only evaluate trust on node, but
also relies on data trustworthiness for trust calculations.
A. Accuracy of Trust Model under MiTM Attacks
Fig. 7 depicts the accuracy of NOTRINO against MiTM
attacks, where the attacker is changing the content of the
safety messages and polluting the network with malicious and
compromised messages. Fig. 7a and Fig. 7b shows precision
and recall of NOTRINO and baseline trust models for a
network where the quantity of MiTM attackers are increased
from 5% to 40%. It depicts that high precision and recall
values are achieved for low number of MiTM attackers.
However, as the quantity of MiTM attackers are increased in
the network, both precision and recall decreases, as expected
due to the fact that MiTM pollutes the network with malicious
content, hence limiting the ability of the legitimate vehicles
to classify between true and malicious content. However,
compared to the baseline trust models, NOTRINO ensures
high precision and recall even in presence of high number of
MiTM attackers, illustrating that our proposal is efficient in
coping and dealing with MiTM attackers. There are two main
reasons behind this efficiency. (1) First, NOTRINO quickly
detects dishonest nodes at the lower layer, thus, messages
are revoked and stopped being further disseminated in the
network. (2) Second, integrated RoT trust scheme ensures that
legitimate vehicles in the network receive trusted content, even
in presence of adversaries. Further, comparing to baseline trust
models, NOTRINO achieves high accuracy of detecting MiTM
attacks as illustrated by F-Measure in Fig. 7c. For instance,
NOTRINO ensures accuracy over 90%, while baseline trust
model achieves F-score, less than 87.5% for a network with
15% MiTM adversaries.
B. Accuracy of Trust Model under Zig-zag Attacks
Fig. 8 shows the accuracy of the proposed trust model in
terms of precision, recall and F-Measure respectively for an
advanced attack, i.e., zig-zag attacks where attackers randomly
change their behaviour in order to deceive legitimate vehicles.
When such dishonest nodes are introduced within the network,
the accuracy decreases significantly in terms of precision and
recall as shown in Fig. 8a and Fig. 8b. This is due to the fact
that these malicious vehicles can dominate the network, thus
limiting the ability of the legitimate vehicles by introducing
more and more malicious data in the network. However,
11










































































Fig. 8: Accuracy of Proposed Trust Model under zig-zag attacks (a) Precision (b) Recall (c) F-Measure









































































Fig. 9: Accuracy of Proposed Trust Model under combined attacks (a) Precision (b) Recall (c) F-Measure
NOTRINO achieves high accuracy compared to the baseline
trust models, i.e., high precision and recall can be achieved via
our method. For instance, for a network with 35% malicious
nodes, the precision and recall achieved via our trust model is
nearly 85%. The main reason behind achieving this accuracy
is the integration of role-oriented trust management scheme
which can ensure the propagation of trusted information in the
network by identifying malicious vehicles and their content.
Finally, Fig. 8c shows F-Measure of the trust models which
is one of the significant metrics to measure the accuracy of
the trust model. As shown in Fig. 8a and Fig. 8b, varying the
number of malicious nodes can affect the overall performance
of VANET. Therefore, F-Measure can show that how accurate
is the trust model. The results suggest that compared to
baseline trust models, the proposed trust model can achieve
high accuracy in terms of F-Measure, i.e., in presence of 40%
malicious nodes, our trust model ensures accuracy of 82.7%,
while the baseline trust model achieves accuracy of less than
80%.
C. Accuracy of Trust Model under Combined Attacks
We also validated the performance of NOTRINO by con-
sidering a scenario where both MiTM and zig-zag attackers
are present in the network. In this scenario, both MiTM
and zig-zag attackers are kept in equal proportion within the
network. Fig. 9 shows the efficiency of NOTRINO in operating
efficiently in presence of combined attackers, where it achieves
higher precision, recall and respective F-Measure. NOTRINO
achieves higher accuracy as compared to baseline trust mod-
els for a small number of malicious nodes in the network.
However, as the network is polluted with high number of
combined attackers, accuracy in terms of precision, recall and
F-Measure decreases for all trust models. For a network with
30% attackers, NOTRINO ensures an accuracy of nearly 90%
as compared to baseline trust models, where it falls below
86%.
D. Impact of Node Density on Trust Models
We also conducted experiments to evaluate the performance
of NOTRINO based on various legitimate vehicles within the
network. Fig. 10 depicts the precision, recall and F-Measure
of NOTRINO, for a network containing different legitimate
vehicles. As shown, the smaller number of legitimate vehicles
generates a smaller number of trusted contents within the
network. However, as the network experience more legitimate
vehicles, respective precision, recall and F-measure increases.
This is due to the fact that more and more legitimate vehicles
will be present in order to disseminate trusted content in
the network. However, comparing to baseline trust models,
NOTRINO performs better even for a network containing
low number of legitimate vehicles. This is true because our












































































Fig. 10: Impact of Node Density on Trust Models (a) Precision (b) Recall (c) F-Measure



















































Variation of Trust in Legitimate Vehicles
(b)






























Variation of Trust in Malicious Vehicles
(c)
Fig. 11: (a) Trust Metric (b) Trust Variation for Legitimate Nodes (c) Trust Variation for Malicious Nodes
propagation of trusted content within the network. For a
network with 50 legitimate nodes, NOTRINO achieves over
90% accuracy in terms of F-measure. This increases to 95%
if the number of legitimate nodes are doubled within the
network, illustrating the high efficiency of our proposal.
E. Impact of Trust on Legitimate and Dishonest Nodes
Fig. 11a depicts the behaviour of trust metric in the network
for our trust model, bench-marked against three baseline
methods. It can be seen that our proposed TM ensures high
trust values, as compared to other trust models. This is due
to the presence of role-oriented vehicles in the network which
ensures the propagation of trusted information in the network.
Further, we can see that trust decreases with the increase of
malicious nodes. As these nodes generate malicious content by
compromising the original content of the messages, therefore,
the overall trust decreases. Compared to bench-marked trust
models, our proposed trust model maintains high trust metric
for high number of malicious nodes. For instance, for the
network with 40% malicious nodes, our trust model achieves
trust metric of about 75% level, while, the metric for bench-
marked trust models is below 60%.
Further, we also plotted the behaviour and variation of trust
metric for both legitimate and malicious nodes in Fig. 11b
and Fig. 11c. We can see from Fig. 11c, that for a network
with low malicious (0% - 20%) and high malicious (21% -
40%) nodes, the trust is always below the trust threshold, i.e.,
0.5. This ensures that a very low number of false negatives are
generated through our proposal. On the other hand, the trust for
legitimate vehicles is always higher than the trust threshold,
thus assuming that few false positives are generated in the
network.
F. Packet Detection Rate vs Trust Threshold
Fig. 12 depicts the comparison of trust threshold on the
overall packet detection rate of the network. Clearly, our pro-
































Fig. 12: Impact of Trust Threshold on Packet Detection Rate
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posal ensures higher detection rates for different trust threshold
as compared to baseline methods where the increasing trust
threshold reduces the packet detection rates. It should be
noted that increasing trust threshold will reduce the overall
packet detection rates as the criteria to classify the message
as trustworthy will be stricken. However, our trust model
performs better even for higher trust threshold, i.e., about 70%
packets can be detected through our trust model for threshold
level of 0.7. On the other hand, baseline methods achieve less
than 60% packet detection rate, if trust threshold is set to 0.7.
G. Impact of Time on Trust Model
In this paper, we evaluated the time parameter within the
VANET from the perspective of end-to-end (E2E) delay. Fig.
13 shows the overall E2E delay of NOTRINO, compared to
other baseline trust models. It shows that all the baseline trust
models achieve high E2E delay when malicious nodes are
introduced in the network. Especially, this E2E delay is high
when the network is polluted with high number of malicious
nodes. On the other hand, NOTRINO ensures lower E2E
delays even if the network is polluted with high number of
malicious nodes. This is due to the reason that our proposed
trust model operates in two stages, therefore, if the entity
is classified as malicious, the content is revoked from the
network, therefore, enabling the other vehicles to access the
correct information with minimum delays. Fig. 13 depicts that
NOTRINO achieves E2E delays of less than 1.5 seconds,
while the baseline trust models achieve E2E delay of more
than 2 seconds. As stated earlier, VANET propagates sensitive
information among its peers, therefore, the network must
guarantee minimum E2E delays in the network [52].























Fig. 13: End-to-End Delay
VII. CONCLUSION
Disseminating accurate, authentic and trusted information
is of paramount importance within IoV environment. Due
to open nature of IoV, adversaries can also be part of the
network which mostly aim to distribute compromised informa-
tion among network nodes. To solve this issue, we proposed
NOTRINO, a novel hybrid trust model for IoV. NOTRINO
operates in two steps to efficiently revoke not only the dis-
honest nodes, but also its compromised messages. Extensive
simulations are carried out to validate our proposal. Simulation
results depicted that NOTRINO performs better than other
hybrid benchmarked trust models in terms of achieving better
precision, recall, F-Measure, event detection probability, and
efficiently detecting and classifying messages as trustworthy
or malicious. This is due to the fact that NOTRINO enables
the participating nodes to efficiently identify dishonest nodes
at the lower layer. This enables the nodes within the network
to quickly detect and classify nodes as legitimate or dishonest
in short duration of time.
Our future step includes the integration of social networks
with NOTRINO, which is one significant source of providing
information within IoV.
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